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author | BeatLink <beatlink@protonmail.com> | 2019-07-13 21:13:34 -0500 |
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committer | BeatLink <beatlink@protonmail.com> | 2019-07-13 21:13:34 -0500 |
commit | c269040ff5cdf9a356307aa7f6df92ec4684841c (patch) | |
tree | 20f5e31561a823c51f0186182b28804443247a33 /dev/debugging/debug-notes.log | |
parent | remove redundant points from debug notes (diff) | |
download | librewolf-linux-c269040ff5cdf9a356307aa7f6df92ec4684841c.tar.gz librewolf-linux-c269040ff5cdf9a356307aa7f6df92ec4684841c.tar.bz2 librewolf-linux-c269040ff5cdf9a356307aa7f6df92ec4684841c.zip |
Delete dev folder
Diffstat (limited to 'dev/debugging/debug-notes.log')
-rw-r--r-- | dev/debugging/debug-notes.log | 201 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 201 deletions
diff --git a/dev/debugging/debug-notes.log b/dev/debugging/debug-notes.log deleted file mode 100644 index fd1f7e6..0000000 --- a/dev/debugging/debug-notes.log +++ /dev/null @@ -1,201 +0,0 @@ -======================================================================================================================== -Build Notes v2 : -======================================================================================================================== - - -- Tor files to remove : - - Classic removal plus - https-everywhere addon - profile.meek-http-helper... - -- Patching release : - - >browser.omni.ja.chrome.browser.content.browser.preferences.in-content.privacy.origin (patch with winrar) - Tor : patch mozilla.cfg - -- Tor windows : - - Install it to desktop then get the files - (Only the lnk file is a new file compared to compressed version) - remove lnk file - add link.vbs - add bat file - -- Tor mac : - - Under mac, mount and extract all content to a folder - Copy by command .DS_Store (from dmg to folder) - run "codesign --remove-signature Tor\ Browser.app". - With disk utils, create a dmg from a folder (nocompression rw) - We are converting iso-dmg to dmg... - -======================================================================================================================== -JS Note & Debugging : -======================================================================================================================== - -// ---------- -// CSP Note : -// ---------- -// -// Syntax : -// One or more sources can be allowed for the default-src policy: -// Content-Security-Policy: default-src <source> <source>; -// Content-Security-Policy: default-src <source>; -// -// default-src is a fallback for : -// - child-src -// - connect-src -// - font-src -// - frame-src -// - img-src -// - manifest-src -// - media-src -// - object-src -// - prefetch-src -// - script-src -// - style-src -// - worker-src -// -// <source> can be one of the following: -// -// 'none' -// Refers to the empty set; that is, no URLs match. The single quotes are required. -// -// 'self' -// Refers to the origin from which the protected document is being served, -// including the same URL scheme and port number. You must include the single quotes. -// Some browsers specifically exclude blob and filesystem from source directives. -// Sites needing to allow these content types can specify them using the Data attribute. -// -// 'unsafe-inline' -// Allows the use of inline resources, such as inline <script> elements, javascript: -// URLs, inline event handlers, and inline <style> elements. You must include the single quotes. -// -// 'unsafe-eval' -// Allows the use of eval() and similar methods for creating code from strings. -// You must include the single quotes. -// -// <scheme-source> -// A schema such as 'http:' or 'https:'. The colon is required, single quotes -// shouldn't be used. You can also specify data schemas (not recommended). -// - data: Allows data: URIs to be used as a content source. This is insecure; -// An attacker can also inject arbitrary data: URIs. -// Use this sparingly and definitely not for scripts. -// - mediastream: Allows mediastream: URIs to be used as a content source. -// - blob: Allows blob: URIs to be used as a content source. -// - filesystem: Allows filesystem: URIs to be used as a content source. -// -// <host-source> -// Internet hosts by name or IP address, as well as an optional URL scheme and/or port number. -// The site's address may include an optional leading wildcard (the asterisk character, '*'), -// and you may use a wildcard (again, '*') as the port number, indicating that all -// legal ports are valid for the source. -// Examples: -// - http://*.example.com: Matches all attempts to load from any subdomain of example.com using the http: URL scheme. -// - mail.example.com:443: Matches all attempts to access port 443 on mail.example.com. -// - https://store.example.com: Matches all attempts to access store.example.com using https:. -// -// Sources : -// https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/CSP -// https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy/default-src - -// ----------------- -// Process Isolation -// ----------------- -// -// Pref : Separate process for protocol -// defaultPref("extensions.webextensions.protocol.remote", true); //default true -// -// Pref : Separate process for protocol extension -// defaultPref("extensions.webextensions.remote", false); //default true -// -// Process remote (separating process) can partially firewall extension by -// denying access to some moz-extension (extension internal url like settings page) -// but this is not reliable not usable for a purpose of firewalling -// Setting this to false will break moz-extension URI loading -// unless other process sandboxing and extension remoting prefs are changed. -// Note, extensions.webextensions.protocol.remote=false is for -// debugging purposes only. With process-level sandboxing, child -// processes (specifically content and extension processes), will -// not be able to load most moz-extension URI's when the pref is -// set to false. - -// ------------------ -// Restricted Domains -// ------------------ -// -// "extensions.webextensions.restrictedDomains" -// -// gHacks set this to empty ""... this is list of blocked domain for ext. -// Default value : -// "accounts-static.cdn.mozilla.net,accounts.firefox.com,addons.cdn.mozilla.net,addons.mozilla.org, -// api.accounts.firefox.com,content.cdn.mozilla.net,content.cdn.mozilla.net,discovery. -// addons.mozilla.org,input.mozilla.org,install.mozilla.org,oauth.accounts.firefox. -// com,profile.accounts.firefox.com,support.mozilla.org,sync.services. -// mozilla.com,testpilot.firefox.com" -// -// Managed in -// AddonManagerWebAPI.cpp -// WebExtensionPolicy.cpp -// -// Check function (When fail directly return deny) : -// -// WebExtensionPolicy::IsRestrictedURI -// - Check againt restrictedDomains (false-allow) domains->Contains -// - Check if IsValidSite (deny access) (false-allow) -// --- Check if empty string --(false-allow) -// --- Check https/http --(false-allow) -// --- Check SSL --(false-allow) -// --- Allow those domain directly --(true---deny) -// "addons.mozilla.org" -// "discovery.addons.mozilla.org" -// "testpilot.firefox.com" -// --- If pref "extensions.webapi.testing" --(true---deny) -// is true, it allow access to other -// sites list -// --- Return false --(false-allow) -// - Return false (false-allow) - -// ----------------- -// Other Possibility -// ----------------- -// -// Other possibility (securefox extension) compare requests to url... filter etc... -// -// Other possibility... recompile and make it a native feature... (may be for futur version) -// Just invert the code to be !domains->Contains and thus allow only listed domain -// -// Other hidden setting -// int dom.ipc.keepProcessesAlive.extension //hidden settings -// -// Conclusion : patching binary "IsRestrictedURI" function OR build own version -// Durable solution is to rebuild... this feature is paused until futur versions -// - -// --------------------------------------- -// Pref : CSP Settings For Extensions I/II -// --------------------------------------- -// -// Default Value : " -// script-src 'self' https://* moz-extension: blob: filesystem: 'unsafe-eval' 'unsafe-inline'; -// object-src 'self' https://* moz-extension: blob: filesystem:; -// " -// -// Default Deny Value : " -// default-src 'self' moz-extension: blob: filesystem: 'unsafe-eval' 'unsafe-inline'; -// script-src 'self' moz-extension: blob: filesystem: 'unsafe-eval' 'unsafe-inline'; -// object-src 'self' moz-extension: blob: filesystem:; -// " -// -// Strict Deny Value : " -// default-src 'self' moz-extension: blob: filesystem:; -// script-src 'self' moz-extension: blob: filesystem: 'unsafe-eval' 'unsafe-inline'; -// object-src 'self' moz-extension: blob: filesystem:; -// " -// -// Super Strict Deny Value : " -// default-src 'none'; -// script-src 'self' moz-extension: blob: filesystem: 'unsafe-eval' 'unsafe-inline'; -// object-src 'self' moz-extension: blob: filesystem:; -// " |