From 91fad0b6c330c35129b069fab8bdf5c4ba479ddf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: B Stack Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2019 23:54:24 -0400 Subject: add openssl-freefilesync --- .../openssl-1.1.1-fips-crng-test.patch | 407 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 407 insertions(+) create mode 100644 openssl-freefilesync/openssl-1.1.1-fips-crng-test.patch (limited to 'openssl-freefilesync/openssl-1.1.1-fips-crng-test.patch') diff --git a/openssl-freefilesync/openssl-1.1.1-fips-crng-test.patch b/openssl-freefilesync/openssl-1.1.1-fips-crng-test.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..91841f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl-freefilesync/openssl-1.1.1-fips-crng-test.patch @@ -0,0 +1,407 @@ +diff -up openssl-1.1.1b/crypto/include/internal/rand_int.h.crng-test openssl-1.1.1b/crypto/include/internal/rand_int.h +--- openssl-1.1.1b/crypto/include/internal/rand_int.h.crng-test 2019-05-07 08:56:33.242179136 +0200 ++++ openssl-1.1.1b/crypto/include/internal/rand_int.h 2019-05-07 09:54:14.920204875 +0200 +@@ -49,6 +49,14 @@ size_t rand_drbg_get_additional_data(RAN + + void rand_drbg_cleanup_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *out); + ++/* CRNG test entropy filter callbacks. */ ++size_t rand_crngt_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg, ++ unsigned char **pout, ++ int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len, ++ int prediction_resistance); ++void rand_crngt_cleanup_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg, ++ unsigned char *out, size_t outlen); ++ + /* + * RAND_POOL functions + */ +diff -up openssl-1.1.1b/crypto/rand/build.info.crng-test openssl-1.1.1b/crypto/rand/build.info +--- openssl-1.1.1b/crypto/rand/build.info.crng-test 2019-05-07 09:54:14.921204857 +0200 ++++ openssl-1.1.1b/crypto/rand/build.info 2019-05-07 09:55:22.730014705 +0200 +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ + LIBS=../../libcrypto + SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ +- randfile.c rand_lib.c rand_err.c rand_egd.c \ ++ randfile.c rand_lib.c rand_err.c rand_crng_test.c rand_egd.c \ + rand_win.c rand_unix.c rand_vms.c drbg_lib.c drbg_ctr.c +diff -up openssl-1.1.1b/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c.crng-test openssl-1.1.1b/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c +--- openssl-1.1.1b/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c.crng-test 2019-02-26 15:15:30.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssl-1.1.1b/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c 2019-05-07 10:04:51.753157224 +0200 +@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL private_drbg; + + + /* NIST SP 800-90A DRBG recommends the use of a personalization string. */ +-static const char ossl_pers_string[] = "OpenSSL NIST SP 800-90A DRBG"; ++static const char ossl_pers_string[] = DRBG_DEFAULT_PERS_STRING; + + static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_drbg_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; + +@@ -201,8 +201,13 @@ static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(int secu + drbg->parent = parent; + + if (parent == NULL) { ++#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS ++ drbg->get_entropy = rand_crngt_get_entropy; ++ drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_crngt_cleanup_entropy; ++#else + drbg->get_entropy = rand_drbg_get_entropy; + drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy; ++#endif + #ifndef RAND_DRBG_GET_RANDOM_NONCE + drbg->get_nonce = rand_drbg_get_nonce; + drbg->cleanup_nonce = rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce; +diff -up openssl-1.1.1b/crypto/rand/rand_crng_test.c.crng-test openssl-1.1.1b/crypto/rand/rand_crng_test.c +--- openssl-1.1.1b/crypto/rand/rand_crng_test.c.crng-test 2019-05-07 09:54:14.925204787 +0200 ++++ openssl-1.1.1b/crypto/rand/rand_crng_test.c 2019-05-07 09:54:14.932204664 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. ++ * Copyright (c) 2019, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use ++ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy ++ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at ++ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html ++ */ ++ ++/* ++ * Implementation of the FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 Conditional Tests. ++ */ ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include "internal/rand_int.h" ++#include "internal/thread_once.h" ++#include "rand_lcl.h" ++ ++static RAND_POOL *crngt_pool; ++static unsigned char crngt_prev[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; ++ ++int (*crngt_get_entropy)(unsigned char *, unsigned char *, unsigned int *) ++ = &rand_crngt_get_entropy_cb; ++ ++int rand_crngt_get_entropy_cb(unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *md, ++ unsigned int *md_size) ++{ ++ int r; ++ size_t n; ++ unsigned char *p; ++ ++ n = rand_pool_acquire_entropy(crngt_pool); ++ if (n >= CRNGT_BUFSIZ) { ++ p = rand_pool_detach(crngt_pool); ++ r = EVP_Digest(p, CRNGT_BUFSIZ, md, md_size, EVP_sha256(), NULL); ++ if (r != 0) ++ memcpy(buf, p, CRNGT_BUFSIZ); ++ rand_pool_reattach(crngt_pool, p); ++ return r; ++ } ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++void rand_crngt_cleanup(void) ++{ ++ rand_pool_free(crngt_pool); ++ crngt_pool = NULL; ++} ++ ++int rand_crngt_init(void) ++{ ++ unsigned char buf[CRNGT_BUFSIZ]; ++ ++ if ((crngt_pool = rand_pool_new(0, CRNGT_BUFSIZ, CRNGT_BUFSIZ)) == NULL) ++ return 0; ++ if (crngt_get_entropy(buf, crngt_prev, NULL)) { ++ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, sizeof(buf)); ++ return 1; ++ } ++ rand_crngt_cleanup(); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_crngt_init_flag = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; ++DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_crngt_init) ++{ ++ return OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL) ++ && rand_crngt_init() ++ && OPENSSL_atexit(&rand_crngt_cleanup); ++} ++ ++int rand_crngt_single_init(void) ++{ ++ return RUN_ONCE(&rand_crngt_init_flag, do_rand_crngt_init); ++} ++ ++size_t rand_crngt_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg, ++ unsigned char **pout, ++ int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len, ++ int prediction_resistance) ++{ ++ unsigned char buf[CRNGT_BUFSIZ], md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; ++ unsigned int sz; ++ RAND_POOL *pool; ++ size_t q, r = 0, s, t = 0; ++ int attempts = 3; ++ ++ if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_crngt_init_flag, do_rand_crngt_init)) ++ return 0; ++ ++ if ((pool = rand_pool_new(entropy, min_len, max_len)) == NULL) ++ return 0; ++ ++ while ((q = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1)) > 0 && attempts-- > 0) { ++ s = q > sizeof(buf) ? sizeof(buf) : q; ++ if (!crngt_get_entropy(buf, md, &sz) ++ || memcmp(crngt_prev, md, sz) == 0 ++ || !rand_pool_add(pool, buf, s, s * 8)) ++ goto err; ++ memcpy(crngt_prev, md, sz); ++ t += s; ++ attempts++; ++ } ++ r = t; ++ *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool); ++err: ++ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, sizeof(buf)); ++ rand_pool_free(pool); ++ return r; ++} ++ ++void rand_crngt_cleanup_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg, ++ unsigned char *out, size_t outlen) ++{ ++ OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen); ++} +diff -up openssl-1.1.1b/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h.crng-test openssl-1.1.1b/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h +--- openssl-1.1.1b/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h.crng-test 2019-05-07 08:56:33.330177674 +0200 ++++ openssl-1.1.1b/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h 2019-05-07 09:54:14.933204647 +0200 +@@ -33,7 +33,15 @@ + # define MASTER_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL (60*60) /* 1 hour */ + # define SLAVE_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL (7*60) /* 7 minutes */ + +- ++/* ++ * The number of bytes that constitutes an atomic lump of entropy with respect ++ * to the FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 Conditional Tests. The size is somewhat ++ * arbitrary, the smaller the value, the less entropy is consumed on first ++ * read but the higher the probability of the test failing by accident. ++ * ++ * The value is in bytes. ++ */ ++#define CRNGT_BUFSIZ 16 + + /* + * Maximum input size for the DRBG (entropy, nonce, personalization string) +@@ -44,7 +52,8 @@ + */ + # define DRBG_MAX_LENGTH INT32_MAX + +- ++/* The default nonce */ ++# define DRBG_DEFAULT_PERS_STRING "OpenSSL NIST SP 800-90A DRBG" + + /* + * Maximum allocation size for RANDOM_POOL buffers +@@ -290,4 +299,22 @@ int rand_drbg_enable_locking(RAND_DRBG * + /* initializes the AES-CTR DRBG implementation */ + int drbg_ctr_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg); + ++/* ++ * Entropy call back for the FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 Conditional Tests. ++ * These need to be exposed for the unit tests. ++ */ ++int rand_crngt_get_entropy_cb(unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *md, ++ unsigned int *md_size); ++extern int (*crngt_get_entropy)(unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *md, ++ unsigned int *md_size); ++int rand_crngt_init(void); ++void rand_crngt_cleanup(void); ++ ++/* ++ * Expose the run once initialisation function for the unit tests because. ++ * they need to restart from scratch to validate the first block is skipped ++ * properly. ++ */ ++int rand_crngt_single_init(void); ++ + #endif +diff -up openssl-1.1.1b/test/drbgtest.c.crng-test openssl-1.1.1b/test/drbgtest.c +--- openssl-1.1.1b/test/drbgtest.c.crng-test 2019-02-26 15:15:30.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssl-1.1.1b/test/drbgtest.c 2019-05-07 10:06:24.706551561 +0200 +@@ -143,6 +143,31 @@ static size_t kat_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg, + return t->noncelen; + } + ++ /* ++ * Disable CRNG testing if it is enabled. ++ * If the DRBG is ready or in an error state, this means an instantiate cycle ++ * for which the default personalisation string is used. ++ */ ++static int disable_crngt(RAND_DRBG *drbg) ++{ ++ static const char pers[] = DRBG_DEFAULT_PERS_STRING; ++ const int instantiate = drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED; ++ ++ if (drbg->get_entropy != rand_crngt_get_entropy) ++ return 1; ++ ++ if ((instantiate && !RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(drbg)) ++ || !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, &rand_drbg_get_entropy, ++ &rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy, ++ &rand_drbg_get_nonce, ++ &rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce)) ++ || (instantiate ++ && !RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, (const unsigned char *)pers, ++ sizeof(pers) - 1))) ++ return 0; ++ return 1; ++} ++ + static int uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg) + { + int ret = drbg == NULL ? 1 : RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(drbg); +@@ -168,7 +193,8 @@ static int single_kat(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA + if (!TEST_ptr(drbg = RAND_DRBG_new(td->nid, td->flags, NULL))) + return 0; + if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, kat_entropy, NULL, +- kat_nonce, NULL))) { ++ kat_nonce, NULL)) ++ || !TEST_true(disable_crngt(drbg))) { + failures++; + goto err; + } +@@ -286,7 +312,8 @@ static int error_check(DRBG_SELFTEST_DAT + unsigned int reseed_counter_tmp; + int ret = 0; + +- if (!TEST_ptr(drbg = RAND_DRBG_new(0, 0, NULL))) ++ if (!TEST_ptr(drbg = RAND_DRBG_new(0, 0, NULL)) ++ || !TEST_true(disable_crngt(drbg))) + goto err; + + /* +@@ -699,6 +726,10 @@ static int test_rand_drbg_reseed(void) + || !TEST_ptr_eq(private->parent, master)) + return 0; + ++ /* Disable CRNG testing for the master DRBG */ ++ if (!TEST_true(disable_crngt(master))) ++ return 0; ++ + /* uninstantiate the three global DRBGs */ + RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(private); + RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(public); +@@ -919,7 +950,8 @@ static int test_rand_seed(void) + size_t rand_buflen; + size_t required_seed_buflen = 0; + +- if (!TEST_ptr(master = RAND_DRBG_get0_master())) ++ if (!TEST_ptr(master = RAND_DRBG_get0_master()) ++ || !TEST_true(disable_crngt(master))) + return 0; + + #ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE +@@ -968,6 +1000,95 @@ static int test_rand_add(void) + return 1; + } + ++/* ++ * A list of the FIPS DRGB types. ++ */ ++static const struct s_drgb_types { ++ int nid; ++ int flags; ++} drgb_types[] = { ++ { NID_aes_128_ctr, 0 }, ++ { NID_aes_192_ctr, 0 }, ++ { NID_aes_256_ctr, 0 }, ++}; ++ ++/* Six cases for each covers seed sizes up to 32 bytes */ ++static const size_t crngt_num_cases = 6; ++ ++static size_t crngt_case, crngt_idx; ++ ++static int crngt_entropy_cb(unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *md, ++ unsigned int *md_size) ++{ ++ size_t i, z; ++ ++ if (!TEST_int_lt(crngt_idx, crngt_num_cases)) ++ return 0; ++ /* Generate a block of unique data unless this is the duplication point */ ++ z = crngt_idx++; ++ if (z > 0 && crngt_case == z) ++ z--; ++ for (i = 0; i < CRNGT_BUFSIZ; i++) ++ buf[i] = (unsigned char)(i + 'A' + z); ++ return EVP_Digest(buf, CRNGT_BUFSIZ, md, md_size, EVP_sha256(), NULL); ++} ++ ++static int test_crngt(int n) ++{ ++ const struct s_drgb_types *dt = drgb_types + n / crngt_num_cases; ++ RAND_DRBG *drbg = NULL; ++ unsigned char buff[100]; ++ size_t ent; ++ int res = 0; ++ int expect; ++ ++ if (!TEST_true(rand_crngt_single_init())) ++ return 0; ++ rand_crngt_cleanup(); ++ ++ if (!TEST_ptr(drbg = RAND_DRBG_new(dt->nid, dt->flags, NULL))) ++ return 0; ++ ent = (drbg->min_entropylen + CRNGT_BUFSIZ - 1) / CRNGT_BUFSIZ; ++ crngt_case = n % crngt_num_cases; ++ crngt_idx = 0; ++ crngt_get_entropy = &crngt_entropy_cb; ++ if (!TEST_true(rand_crngt_init())) ++ goto err; ++#ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS ++ if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, &rand_crngt_get_entropy, ++ &rand_crngt_cleanup_entropy, ++ &rand_drbg_get_nonce, ++ &rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce))) ++ goto err; ++#endif ++ expect = crngt_case == 0 || crngt_case > ent; ++ if (!TEST_int_eq(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, NULL, 0), expect)) ++ goto err; ++ if (!expect) ++ goto fin; ++ if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, sizeof(buff), 0, NULL, 0))) ++ goto err; ++ ++ expect = crngt_case == 0 || crngt_case > 2 * ent; ++ if (!TEST_int_eq(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, NULL, 0, 0), expect)) ++ goto err; ++ if (!expect) ++ goto fin; ++ if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, sizeof(buff), 0, NULL, 0))) ++ goto err; ++ ++fin: ++ res = 1; ++err: ++ if (!res) ++ TEST_note("DRBG %zd case %zd block %zd", n / crngt_num_cases, ++ crngt_case, crngt_idx); ++ uninstantiate(drbg); ++ RAND_DRBG_free(drbg); ++ crngt_get_entropy = &rand_crngt_get_entropy_cb; ++ return res; ++} ++ + int setup_tests(void) + { + app_data_index = RAND_DRBG_get_ex_new_index(0L, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); +@@ -980,5 +1101,6 @@ int setup_tests(void) + #if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) + ADD_TEST(test_multi_thread); + #endif ++ ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_crngt, crngt_num_cases * OSSL_NELEM(drgb_types)); + return 1; + } -- cgit